HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE AGUERO?

It is unanimously agreed that two players stand above all others in world football. The rivalry between Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo, stemming more from the disparity of the histories of the fiercely Catalan Barca and General Franco’s los blancos than any modicum of personal animosity, has dominated the sport for the past decade. The vast majority agree on the composition of the second tier of the game’s elite; Luis Suarez, Neymar, Robert Lewandowski, Arjen Robben and Manchester City’s talismanic Argentine Sergio Aguero all make the cut. The latter boasts the lowest minute per goal ration in the history of the Premier League, and scored its quickest quintuple in his last home game against Newcastle.

Yet the incredible record of scoring every 109 minutes is suggestive of the reason why Aguero has found himself unable to achieve parity with his countryman and Ronaldo. Aguero was carried off against Ecuador with the latest of a succession of leg injuries that have ruled him out for months at a time over the last three seasons. The most recent, a tear to his left femoral biceps, will rule Aguero out for the majority of November as a starting point. As a result of the Argentine’s brilliance, the unaccustomed solidity of City’s defence, and in no small part the collapse of Chelsea, a blue moon has been rising to the top of the Premier League, with no sign of daylight on the horizon. Yet City’s uncompromising fixture list may ensure that by the time Aguero returns to fitness the lead in the league may have been surrendered, and their Champions League campaign may be at an all-too-familiar premature climax. City may have proved that they can blow away weaker opposition without Aguero, courtesy of the 5-1 demolition of newly promoted and injury ravaged Bournemouth. But over the course of the next month, the Citizens will cross the city to contest a hotly-anticipated Manchester derby, play host to a rejuvenated Liverpool side under the tutelage of Jurgen Klopp, with that fixture sandwiched by must-win matches away to Sevilla and Juventus in the Champions League. A failure record a victory in any of those tests will result in something of a deflation in Pellegrini’s side.

The charismatic Chilean is therefore faced with the conundrum of devising a tactical solution to the prolonged absence of Aguero, particularly while creator-in-chief David Silva continues to struggle through his own ongoing fitness concerns. This must prove effective against the calibre of opposition City will have to overcome if they are to become anything other than also-rans in European competition and perennial under-achievers on the domestic front.

Fans, neutrals, journalists alike were part of a captivated audience of Pellegrini’s first foray: Wednesdays essential home victory over Sevilla in the Champions League. Yet while the 2-1 triumph will ease the pressure of the aforementioned fixture list, the manner in which it was achieved will have of enormous cause for concern for the onlooking Aguero. City began the match in an orthodox 4-4-2 formation. Pellegrini has been rightfully criticised for an almost dogmatic insistence on playing two strikers in Champions League football. Yet while the defensive consequences of the decision may have been predictable, this is not to say that the reasons for doing so were not justified. These were less concerned with demonstrating flagrant disregard for criticism of his previous decisions to do so than understanding the importance of securing victory in City’s penultimate home game of the group stage and of compensating for the absence of Aguero. The Argentine boasts both the agility and technical ability required to create goalscoring opportunities single-handedly in the tightest of spaces, and the composure and strength needed to finish such chances. After the departures of Edin Dzeko and Stevan Jovetic, City’s striking alternatives to Aguero consist of Raheem Sterling and Wilfried Bony. The England international is renowned for his blistering pace, but his finishing does not compare favourably to the Argentine, meanwhile the former Swansea target-man is a prolific Premier League goalscorer yet lacks the requisite mobility to create ‘something out of nothing’. In order to effectively compensate for the shortcomings in the styles of the pair, both had to start against Sevilla.

The fundamental issue, as already highlighted, would be that Sterling and Bony would need to receive the ball in more space in order to replicate the success of Aguero. Pellegrini’s response to the problem was two-fold in its approach. Neither point was particularly sophisticated. Firstly, the movement of the second striker would be fundamental to the creation of space for the eventual recipient of the ball, their strike partner. Whenever City’s wide – and in Wednesday’s case most creative – players, Jesus Navas and the excellent Kevin de Bruyne had the ball, the near striker would move quickly to the near touchline, intending to draw either an individual defender or the defensive line as a whole across with him, closer to the perceived danger. This would enable the creation of a numerical advantage on the far side of the pitch. If Navas had the ball, Bony would drift over towards the right-sideline, moving one of Tremoulinas, Kolodziejczak or Banega – or all of the above – with him. Bony could then return any pass to Navas, who would find Sterling or de Bruyne advancing into vacated space. On the opposite side, whenever de Bruyne received the ball, Sterling would peel off into the left channel, dragging Coke and others with him. This would then create space for de Bruyne to continue his run, or to find an advancing Yaya Toure or Navas. For City’s first goal, Bony followed the surging run of his countryman, which created space for Sterling when the ball from Toure came into the box, and incidentally ensured Bony was in the right place at the right time to stab home the rebound from Sterling’s effort, courtesy of a massive deflection off Adil Rami.

However, City’s ability to consistently create a numerical advantage on the opposite flank was undermined by the relative restraint of their typically rampaging full backs. With Kolarov and Clichy not deemed ready to start, Bacary Sagna was played out of position at left back. Conscious of the speed of Konoplyanka and Vitolo on Sevilla’s flanks and of their own limitations in defensive midfield, Sagna and Zabaleta rarely offered offensive support in the first half.

Pellegrini’s second mechanism for creating space for his two strikers, whilst also attempting to reduce the pressure on the depleted central midfield, was implemented through disciplined zonal pressing. City would not press in central areas, instead waiting for the ball to be circulated to Sevilla’s full backs. Navas and de Bruyne would then apply intensive pressure, in an attempt to force a mistake in possession and thereby create a counter-attack, typically a four versus four. Yet City rarely won possession this way; the pressure either only ‘forced’ Sevilla to pass back to the centre-backs, who could then pass vertically to the midfield three as a result of low pressure from Sterling and Bony, or would fail altogether, with the ball moving to the wingers or central midfield directly. The flawed high-intensity pressure of Navas and de Bruyne, combined with their numerical disadvantage in central midfield, ensured that when the ball was moved into such positions, Sevilla would not be short of passing options. The Spanish side were consistently able to circulate the ball into wide positions on either flank, and swing dangerous balls into the penalty area that challenged the poor relationship between Eliaquim Mangala and Nicolas Otamendi and the lack of support the pair would receive from Fernandinho and Toure. The pair would often be forced to decide instinctively which would press the probable recipient of the second ball, should the other lose the aerial duel with Kevin Gameiro. Konoplyanka was able to open the scoring after a lapse of concentration from a throw in, exploiting the unguarded space in front of the former Porto partnership when the ball was laid back to him in the penalty area. In this regard, City seriously missed the leadership of Vincent Kompany, struggling to regain match fitness during his recovery from a calf injury suffered in the Juventus Stadium. City were similarly vunerable from set pieces, with Konoplyanka hitting the post and Krychowiak forcing a smart save from Joe Hart from the rebound among a catalogue of other chances. That the home side ended the half on equal terms was more a result of desperation than discipline.

Pellegrini rightly made changes to his side’s approach in the second half. While the maligned 4-4-2 endured, the Chilean ensured it significantly narrowed. This would provide greater protetction in central midfield, whilst also giving licence to City’s full backs to advance, an ability that was further augmented with the introduction of Kolarov on the hour mark. Increased support from Kolarov allowed Kevin de Bruyne to drift behind the front two, into pockets of space created by the movement of Sterling and Bony. The Belgian began to exude much greater influence on the game from his central position. Yet, in order for City’s full backs to continue to venture forward, Navas, de Bruyne and Yaya Toure would have to work hard when possession was lost in order for City to regain their defensive shape. As the game wore on, such defensive diligence evaporated, particularly in the case of the latter two players. The game became increasingly end-to-end, with little to no restraint, and Sevilla continued to create the clearer chances given the chasms of space afforded to them in both central and wide areas.

Pellegrini’s next move was as effective as it was cynical and damaging. The dwindling defensive intensity of Yaya Toure and de Bruyne was causing all manner of problems for a depleted defence. Moreover, while Bony’s movement had created space for Raheem Sterling in the first half, the young English forward was tiring, and the Ivorian offered incredibly little whilst actually in possession, epitomised when he completely misread Sterling’s intelligent through ball early in the second half. Pellegrini’s solution was to replace Bony with Fernando, a defensive midfielder, drop Raheem Sterling into the left side of midfield, and play Toure and de Bruyne as central strikers. The move highlighted the Bony’s shortcomings, the lack of squad depth in the absence of the injured Aguero and Silva – exacerbated by the sales of Dzeko and Jovetic – and the vulnerability of playing a more orthodox 4-4-2 for ninety minutes. Yet it also ensured that those who no longer had the energy or enthusiasm to fulfil their defensive responsibilities no longer had to, whilst also ensuring that when City counter-attacked they had the players that could retain possession long enough to create a chance in the most advanced areas of the pitch. The intensity of the match eventually took its physical toll on Sevilla. In the dying minutes City capitalised on the away side committing too many players forward in search of a winner. City countered, creating a three versus four against Sevilla’s back line. Yaya Toure fed de Bruyne, who took advantage of some laborious, sluggish and somewhat amateur defending, cutting inside and finishing exquisitely in the ninety-second minute.

City may have recorded a vital victory, but the manner in which it was achieved creates more questions than it answered. In order to maximise the impact of the qualities of Sterling and Bony, both have to play together. But the consequent 4-4-2 will leave City horrifically exposed against teams that look to dominate the midfield through possession and creating a numerical advantage in central positions, and also have the fitness and positional discipline to ensure they are not exposed to counter-attacks. This description matches that of Southampton, Juventus and Liverpool. City travel to Louis van Gaal’s United side in their next fixture: the Dutchman has built an incredibly successful career upon those principles. It is unthinkable that City will set up in the same manner as they did against Sevilla away to a side so adept at the above.

Therefore, it is likely that City will revert to a 4-2-3-1, with either Sterling, Bony or Kevin de Bruyne as the team’s central striker. If Sterling is selected, City would arguably start without a focal point. Sterling could easily be crowded out of the match with Smalling and Blind and then Schneiderlin and Schweinsteiger making the central area very congested. Kevin de Bruyne may suffer the same fate. Furthermore, if David Silva does not recover in time for the match, City would have not one midfielder on the bench, which would be a necessity if City were to apply the exhausting pressure required to disrupt United’s passing. Opting for Wilfried Bony may leave City without the requisite pace to pull the United rearguard out of position, and render City’s approach play somewhat blunt.

Pellegrini’s decisions in the coming days may come to define an entire season.

COUNTERPRESSING THE CULT OF KLOPP

It took less than three hours after the final whistle of the Merseyside derby for Fenway Sports Group to blow the final whistle on Brendan Rodger’s three and a half year tenure as Liverpool manager. In his last interview in charge, Rodgers indicated that the announcement unveiling his sacking would come as no surprise, suggesting that ‘this team, whether it’s me that’s here as manager or someone else’, would need time’.

Yet between the unravelling of his sides charge towards a first Premier League title and his final plea for patience Rodgers had eighteen months, eighty-three matches and some two-hundred million pounds to build a playing squad and style that could come close to replicating his halcyon days structured around Daniel Sturridge, Raheem Sterling and the sensational Luis Suarez. Instead, time had born witness to a side increasingly bereft of identity and creativity. The latter was infamously absent from Rodger’s post-match press conferences. Given the above, ‘great character’ was no longer enough to satisfy the Anfield faithful.

Dour press conferences are certainly not something that can be associated with his successor. The arrival of Jurgen Klopp, inarguably the most charismatic figure in world football fosters the fabled fervour of the ‘cult of the manager’ at Anfield. With its industrial roots, passionate fanbase, feted history in European competitions, and recent ‘plucky underdog’ status compared to wealthier rivals, Liverpool is perceived by many to be the English regeneration of Klopp’s former club Dortmund, and therefore there could be no better man to restore Liverpool to their ‘rightful’ pedestal as a domestic and European superpower. While the former Dortmund icon is a manager that stands the best chance of rejuvenating a squad lacking identity, it is the remarkably similar on-pitch narratives of Rodgers and Klopp that illustrate the true extent of the challenge facing the enigmatic German. The tactical ideologies of the two managers, the influence of those ideologies on their golden eras of management, and the failure to compensate for factors that neutered such success will pour cold water on such theories.

The two central concepts of football emphasise the importance of control. Control of the ball is perceived to singularly concern the nature of opportunities that a team will create, whilst it is suggested that control of the space primarily focuses on limiting the number of chances afforded by the defence to the opposition. However, many of the most successful contemporary managers have stressed the importance of pressing – ie, the manner in which a team approaches controlling the space – as fundamental to the creation of chances. There are many different theories surrounding the importance of pressing and the most efficient way of creating chances using it.

Brendan Rodgers emphasised that the priority of pressing was to win the ball as high up the pitch as possible. This limits the distance between the offensive player and the goal, and therefore reduces the time needed to create a goalscoring opportunity. The intention of the pressing is to suffocate the team in possession, restricting or negating their options in possession, forcing either an errant short pass, an easily interceptable long ball, or a mistake in individual possession. The pressing is therefore applied continuously; with players in a constant state of alert regarding identifying opportunities that maximise the chances of winning the ball, and requires enormous physical exertion to work. This idea summons visions of childhood games of ‘piggy in the middle’, whereby the defenders follow the ball from recipient to recipient, restricting the time available to the carrier. However, like in ‘piggy in the middle’, aggressive pressing requires immense discipline if it is not to be a futile endeavour. If one player too many presses the ball carrier, or if one player too few presses the intended recipient, then an opponent will be unmarked, and the pressing will not just fail, but increase the risk of conceding a chance should that opponent be found. The pressing must therefore be holistic, in that it requires the adherence of all ten outfield players, and nuanced.

The Northern Irishman implemented his ideology with outstanding effectiveness. While Liverpool’s squad contained some remarkable individual talent, including the fabled ‘SASAS’ of Raheem Sterling, Daniel Sturridge and the mercurial Luis Suarez, Rodger’s ideology extracted their full, awesome potential. Rodgers’ formation of choice was a fluid 4-3-3 that afforded the triumvirate the licence to interchange positions due to their shared characteristics of pace and aggression. These attributes facilitated the first maxim of Rodgers’ ideology; that applying pressure higher up the pitch would make the opposition defence, the most technically limited players in the squad, the target of such pressure. Mistakes would be forced far easier, and with much greater consequence. Of particular importance was identifying ‘trigger points’ for pressing the back four. Most commonly, this was the opposition full back receiving the ball, where the sidelines of the pitch would naturally limit options without any action from Liverpool. This would then be exacerbated by zonal pressure of the wingers, whether this was Sturridge, Sterling or Suarez, with the ostensible centre forward shadowing the near centre half, discouraging a sideways ball or backpass. Steven Gerrard would anchor the side, allowing Jordan Henderson or Joe Allen to apply man-to-man pressure on the near deep midfielder. The near attacking midfielder would be intensely pressed by either John Flanagan or Glen Johnson. In the unlikely event that the opposition could break out from the pressure and feed the ball into an attacking midfielder or forward, either Martin Skrtel or Mamadou Sakho would press, allowing team mates the time to get back, or even force a pass back into a pressurised area. In the event that Liverpool won the ball back, then players were close enough together and to the goal to create an opportunity. There would typically be space open for the pace of the front three to ruthlessly exploit. Therefore the pace of the front three was fundamental to uniting the defence and attack and maximising the efficiency of the transition between the two states.

Moreover, against opposition more adept at retaining possession, Rodgers’ ideology demonstrated the tactical flexibility to ensure the domination of midfield, based upon the same principles. Rodgers would deploy Sterling at the tip of a midfield diamond, and task him with pressing the opposition defensive midfielders, further to creating a numerical advantage in the engine room of the opposition’s formation. The zonal pressing of Allen, Henderson, Flanagan and Johnson would force the play back to the defence, occupied by Sturridge and Suarez. In the event that Liverpool won possession, the ball would be fed as quickly as possible to Sterling, who would have space created for him by the unselfish movement of the ‘SAS’. While Liverpool’s soft underbelly of Steven Gerrard – from a defensive perspective – Skrtel, Sakho and Simon Mignolet was frequently exposed, more often than not, the regularity with which Liverpool’s pressing created chances ensured this did not matter. Rodgers’ side averaged 2.56 goals per game in all competitions and secured unanimous plaudits in the process, notwithstanding a crisis of confidence and discipline in the wake of a fatal defeat at home to Chelsea and a capitulation away to Crystal Palace.

To say that those two games ensured that the season ended as an anti-climax would be an understatement of unworldly proportions. The impact may have been the most profound on Luis Suarez, whose Golden Boot-winning tally of thirty-one goals had carried Liverpool to the brink of history. The negativity associated with falling at the final hurdle may have been preying on his mind as he sunk his teeth into Giorgio Chiellini’s shoulder in Uruguay’s final group game of the World Cup. A third suspension for the same offence, the length reflected in the repetition, was the straw that broke the camel’s back for Liverpool’s owners and their resolve to keep hold of their star. That, and a £75m bid from Barcelona. While Rodgers anticipated Suarez’s inevitable departure, rebuilding his squad around the same principles fundamental to Liverpool’s success of last season would be a thankless task, made impossible by the much-discussed failings of the board of executives that the media have unflatteringly dubbed the transfer committee. Rodgers quickly identified not just his number one candidate for replacing Suarez, but the only player he deemed could fill the void left by the Uruguayan. By a happy coincidence, Alexis Sanchez happened to play for the club Suarez was departing for. The Yet Liverpool could neither exploit their bargaining position with Barcelona nor convince the Chilean to choose Anfield over Arsenal.

Instead, Rodgers received nine players. Signing so many players was an obvious necessity, given the physical demands placed on a shallow squad over the course of the previous season, and those that would be required throughout a campaign also featuring Champions League football. Yet the signings were not only largely of insufficient quality to be a part of the first team squad; several constituted the antithesis of the ideas Rodgers distilled. Nothing epitomised this more than the opportunistic signing of target man Rickie Lambert, and, more significantly the panic buy of Mario Balotelli, a player whom cannot easily be given an epithet. The impact of the failure to adequately replace Luis Suarez was made even more acute by the perennial fitness problems of strike partner Daniel Sturridge, who was limited to just seven starts in 2014/15.

The absence of the pair, combined with the inadequacy of their replacements, undermined Liverpool’s ability to both win the ball high up the pitch and exploit that with breathtaking efficiency. Fundamental to this deficiency was the immobility of Balotelli and Lambert. The effect of lacking a centre-forward to apply shadow pressure on the opposition centre-halves was two-fold. Raheem Sterling and new signings Adam Lallana or Lazar Markovic would have to cover a larger pressing zone on each flank. This would increase the undesired element of ‘piggy in the middle’ played between the opposition centre and full back. Meanwhile, the lack of movement of the centre-forward would be less likely to create space for the wingers should Liverpool regain possession. Chance creation would be outsourced from the forward line to Phillipe Coutinho, however, without Balotelli or Lambert stretching the defence, the opposition would be able to retain an effective two-versus-one on each of the offensive three. This would necessitate adopting a 4-2-3-1 formation, with Coutinho in an advanced attacking midfield role. With only one attacking midfielder immediately pressing the opposition defensive – or pivot – midfielders, there would always be an available escape from the high press, and with the defenders coping adequately with Balotelli, Sterling and Lallana, the deep midfielders could isolate Coutinho, forcing him deeper. This would increase the distance between the point of regaining possession and the goal, thereby reducing the options available to the carrier in that instance.

Rodgers’ response to the impact of the shortcomings of his squad on the implementation of his ideology was as emphatic as it was innovative. Once again, Rodgers followed the precedent of Pep Guardiola, and turned the notions of control of the ball and control of the space on their head. Liverpool had conceded 1.4 goals per game on average until the middle of December 2014; an alarming rate considering their discussed failings in attack. Instead of integrating an additional defensive midfielder into his starting eleven, Rodgers instead sacrificed a defender, adopting an adventurous 3-4-2-1 formation. Emre Can, a promising central midfielder signed in the summer for £10m from Leverkusen, slotted in at right-centre half. This significantly improved Liverpool’s ability to retain possession and build moves from deeper positions. Coutinho and Lallana were assigned floating positions behind Raheem Sterling, and could operate in the space that Sterling’s increased movement would create. Meanwhile, Moreno and Markovic, deployed as wing backs, would offer an alternative outball to Gerrard and Henderson. Whenever the English midfielders received the ball, they would have five attacking options to pass to; the near wing back, the two attacking midfielders, a direct pass to Sterling, or a lateral pass to their midfield partner. Moreover, the advanced positions of the wing backs would decrease the size of the pressing zones that the forward line would need to cover, therefore increasing the probability that this would be done successfully. Lallana and Coutinho would also be responsible for limiting the time on the ball of the opposition’s defensive midfielders,  in tandem with Gerrard or Henderson. With the wing backs and Sterling shadow pressing the opposition’s attacking midfielders and centre backs respectively, Liverpool were once more capable of suffocating the opposition. The increased number of players in midfield also ensured that Liverpool’s players were close together should they lose the ball, and therefore more capable of winning it back quickly. This was the first indication of a gradual transition to counter-pressing – a principle that will be covered in far greater detail later.

The tweak was initially staggeringly successful. Between Boxing Day and the middle of March, Liverpool were unbeaten in twelve Premier League games, winning ten. The disappointing exits from European and cup competitions had given the squad the ability to press with the required intensity.  Yet the system was undermined when that intensity eventually and inevitably took its toll on the playing squad. Fatigue can destroy discipline. Liverpool once more only had two deep-lying midfielders, meaning that if the high intensity advanced pressure failed, then Liverpool would be exposed defensively, particularly from wide positions. Meanwhile, as the importance of possession gained close to an equal footing to that of pressing, and as the forward line consisted of attacking midfielders as opposed to pacy inside forwards, no space was exploited behind the opposition’s defence. Liverpool could build moves in the first two thirds of the pitch, but increasingly lacked decisive options in the final third, and became somewhat blunt. Liverpool’s close season form, culminating in a humiliating 6-1 defeat away to Stoke in Steven Gerrard’s final game for the club, ensured the club finished five places and twenty-five points below champions Chelsea.

Through this examination we can clearly understand the regression of the influence and effectiveness of intense and prolonged pressing in the final third. Eventually, the pressing exposed the defensive vulnerability of Liverpool’s deep lying midfielders. The enforced sacrifice of orthodox wingers and inside forwards improved Liverpool’s ability to retain the ball, and by default protected a depleted defence, but left the team bereft of a cutting edge and a limited capacity to capitalise when pressing succeeded. The final proverbial nails in the coffin were the departures of Raheem Sterling and Steven Gerrard in the summer. Sterling’s £49m move to Manchester City ensured Liverpool lost what remained of their ability to press high up the pitch and move the opposition centre-halves around, and Gerrard’s first transfer to LA Galaxy meant that the team could no longer distribute the ball into space quickly. Combined with the raft of new signings – including James Milner, Danny Ings, Christian Benteke, Roberto Firmino and Nathaniel Clyne – the effect was that Liverpool began the 2015/16 season struggling for identity.

In the narrow victories at home and away to Bournemouth and Stoke respectively, Brendan Rodgers deployed a 4-2-3-1 formation, with Henderson and Milner occupying the deep midfield positions and Lallana, Coutinho and Jordan Ibe – recalled from loan at Derby in January – supporting Christian Benteke. A moment of individual brilliance from Coutinho and a clearly offside goal from Benteke secured the wins in matches Liverpool created few chances in, either from open, possession-orientated approach play or by high pressing in the final third. Rodgers reverted to a 4-3-3 against Arsenal, whom they had thrashed 5-1 courtesy of the pressing and pace of Suarez, Sturridge and Sterling, who was deployed at the tip of a midfield diamond that afternoon. This time around, James Milner, Lucas and Emre Can occupied the midfield, with the markedly slower Roberto Firmino and Coutinho operating on the flanks. Without this, Liverpool were unable to capitalise on the catalogue of defensive errors made by a makeshift central defence of Gabriel and Calum Chambers. Coutinho hit the post on numerous occasions after individual efforts, and forced saves from Petr Cech on others. Yet Liverpool abjectly failed when in possession, with distribution from the defence being of particular concern, and afforded Arsenal their own opportunities to comfortably win the game. These opportunities were ruthlessly by West Ham at Anfield, when Liverpool named the same 4-3-3 formation. At half time, Rodgers reverted once more to a 3-4-3, yielding little results. Phillippe Coutinho was given a red card and promptly missed the trip to Manchester United. A narrow front three of Firmino, Benteke and Ings were starved of service going forward, and offered little defensive protection against Anthony Martial. Then, a 3-4-1-2 containing the fit-again Daniel Sturridge yielded five points, as many goals scored and four conceded in winnable games at home to Norwich, Villa and the derby – Rodgers last game in charge.

The start to the season saw Liverpool win just three games from eleven matches. Five of Rodgers’ last six fixtures ended in 1-1 draws; including two Europa League fixtures against Bordeaux and FC Sion and a home draw to Carlisle that Liverpool would win on penalties. Far more significant than the results, however, was the deterioration of the influence of pressing in Rodgers’ side – enforced by the sales of Suarez, Sterling and Gerrard, and the injuries continually sustained by Sturridge – and the absence of an effective solution. Liverpool could no longer apply the high pressure with the same effectiveness.

Enter Jurgen Klopp.

Affectionately dubbed ‘Kloppo’ by the vast majority of his former proteges, the former Borussia Dortmund manager arrived at Anfield with his trademark wit, humour and enthusiasm in tow. The contrast between the charismatic German’s first conference, epitomised by the claim to be ‘the normal one’, and Rodgers’ endless proclamations of character after dour draws or defeats could not be starker. However, the differences between the ideology of Rodgers and that of Klopp are much more subtle. They support the claim of the former that the team ‘whether it’s me or someone else here as manager’ would need time, and that of the latter, who asserted that now was not the time to change so much, just turn the screws a little bit in the right ways’. They also explain the appeal of Klopp as a force of rejuvenation, rather than revolution, at Anfield, and shall also provide an early insight into the familiar difficulties Klopp will encounter. While what follows will not go so far as to claim Klopp will fail in his attempt to restore the success of pressing as central to Liverpool’s playing style, it will stifle the optimism of fans that expect Liverpool to scale the dizzy heights of Dortmund’s awe-inspiring golden era.

Jurgen Klopp is renowned for his advocacy of the gegenpress, or counterpressing. As we have already extensively discussed, Rodgers stressed the importance of winning the ball as far up the pitch as possible, in order to reduce the distance between the goal and the carrier. Gegenpressing instead suggests that more important than where the ball is won is when it is won. It is suggested that in the seconds after the ball is lost, the tackler will be exhausted by the effort required to win the ball back, and will be more focused on the movements of his teammates than the ball at his feet or the opponents trying to win the ball back. His teammates will be beginning to abandon their defensive positions and transition into attack. This window is the target of gegenpressing. Pressure will be applied intensely and zonally, in order to neuter the counter-attack of the opponents, whilst ideally winning the ball in an advanced position. It has proved incredibly effective in the former endeavour. The proportion of goals scored from counterattacks has been cut from forty per cent to twenty percent since the population of gegenpressing. Meanwhile, Klopp suggests that effective gegenpressing is the leading playmaker in Europe, rather than any individual. That in itself led to a modestly assembled Dortmund side beating Bayern to two successive Bundesliga titles, despite the immeasurable wealth of their Bavarian rivals.

Fundamental to the success of gegenpressing – and therefore to the success of Klopp’s Dortmund – is the extent of a team’s ability to cover ‘as few zones on the pitch, with the greatest possible distance between each player in each zone to ensure that the whole of each zone is covered’. Put succinctly, if and when a gegenpressing side loses the ball, the offensive line and midfield must be tightly grouped together, but not so tight as to leave swathes of the pitch and numerous opponents unmarked. For a specified number of seconds, the team would press with incredible intensity, working either to press recipients of passes into central midfield – where the press would be harder, as a result of the number of options available in that area – or pressing technically limited ball carriers. This would simultaneously allow the gegenpressing defence time to regroup, and force the opponents to pass further from danger. Meanwhile, in the event that the ball was reclaimed, the tackler would be surrounded by passing options of his own, with gaps widening in the opposition defence. In this sense, we can see that gegenpressing ensures that teams both attack and defend as a whole.

Therefore, we can claim that there are several factors within both the composition of a squad and the manager’s team selection that will determine a team’s ability to gegenpress with effectiveness. Firstly, the manager must select a narrow formation, in order to reduce the distance between each player and the number of zones that player must cover. Secondly, the players must possess both immense physical fitness and an innate understanding of the most dangerous options available to the opposition. Thirdly – and similarly to advanced pressing – the team must be able to move the ball quickly through to dangerous positions, through a combination of pacey and direct players and a deep-lying playmaker that needs little time on the ball to select and execute the most dangerous pass. The central striker must not only be able to hold the ball up or play on the shoulder of the last defender; he must be able to drop into the space in front of the defenders and play facing goal with an awareness of the movement of the rest of the forward line.

Over seven years with Dortmund, Jurgen Klopp was able to build a team moulded in his principles and dominated by the aforementioned characteristics. The formation of choice was a narrow 4-2-3-1. During the golden years, in which Dortmund won the Bundesliga twice and took Bayern to extra time in an all-German Champions League final. The industrious and uncompromising Sven Bender would set the example for the rest of Dortmund’s midfield to follow with committed challenges and intelligent interceptions. Nuri Sahin and then Ilkay Gundogan would serve as the perfect foil to Bender in midfield. The two Turkish-born central midfielders had an incredible range of passing, enabling Dortmund to move the ball quickly to the forward line. Ivan Perisic or Kevin Grosskreutz served as adequate left sided inside forwards, until the arrival of the outstanding Marco Reus. The prodigiously talented Mario Gotze, schooled in Dortmund’s academy, further enhanced Dortmund’s ability to move the ball forward quickly and intelligently. On his right hand side were Shinji Kagawa or Jakub Blaszczykowski, that allied tremendous work-rate with technical ability and blistering pace respectively. The forward tasked with holding this all together was Robert Lewandowski. The Pole stands out as one of the finest strikers of his generation, with an ability to score goals from a limitless variety of positions. Prior to joining Dortmund, Lewandowski had spent the vast majority of his career playing as a number ten, and the inherent awareness this developed is what made him so valuable to Klopp. These individuals enabled the fundamental prerequisites of successful gegenpressing; intelligent, intense pressing, the ability to move the ball quickly from the moment of regaining possession, and to circulate the possession between a quick forward line into dangerous areas.

This is the beginning of several parallels between the philosophies of Rodgers and Klopp, their experiences at their former clubs, and the manner in which their departure unfolded. As we have established, the differences between the two ideologies of predecessor and incumbent have subtle, rather than substantial differences. Indeed, the departure of Luis Suarez and persistent injury troubles of Daniel Sturridge forced Rodgers to place greater emphasis on both possession football and gegenpressing, the latter particularly inherent in the post-January shift to 3-4-2-1. The departures of Raheem Sterling and Steven Gerrard ensured that while Liverpool retained a squad full of players that understood how to press, it was deprived of the key players that would make such pressing a viable and consistent source of goals.

As we have discussed, Liverpool started this season deploying a narrow 4-2-3-1 formation. This lends itself to comparisons with the successful Dortmund side, which we have described earlier. Many hallmarks of the Dortmund side are replicated in the current Liverpool squad. For example, Liverpool possess quick and adventurous full backs in the shape of Moreno and Clyne that can compensate for the lack of natural width of the 4-2-3-1, fulfilling similar roles to Lukas Piszczek and Marcel Schmelzer at Dortmund. Lucas or Emre Can can act as the anchorman in the double-pivot. Phillipe Coutinho is one of Europe’s outsanding number ten’s at present, and is renowned for his work-rate and enormous technical ability, as Mario Gotze was during his emergence at Dortmund. Meanwhile, Adam Lallana and James Milner can narrow the pitch and therefore the space available to the opposition. However, the author holds grave concerns regarding the remaining positions. While Jordan Henderson is renowned for his industry and long-range shooting, it is questionable whether he possesses the range of intelligent passing of Ilkay Gundogan. The left-sided inside forward position may be filled by either Sturridge or Firmino. The latter lacks the pace for this to be a resounding success. The former, while much quicker than his Brazillian counterpart, cannot be relied upon due to the much-discussed injury record, and, on the occasions where he is fit, would be far more dangerous starting in his preferred position at centre-forward, particularly in a gegenpressing side. Sturridge has the pace and intelligence to play facing goal, something that is lacking in Christian Benteke, who is far more comfortable playing on the shoulder of the centre back.

Therefore, there are serious deficiencies in Liverpool’s squad that may undermine Jurgen Klopp’s ability to replicate gegenpressing to the same success at Anfield. The simplistic response of numerous prominent journalists has been to claim that Klopp can circumvent these shortcomings courtesy of the transfer market, in itself inviting spurious criticism of the failings of Liverpool’s infamous transfer committee.

‘The transfer committee focused on potential and versatility rather than experience and pedigree…’

‘Will Klopp be afforded complete control over the transfers that he needs in order to transform Liverpool…’

And so on.

Far more relevant is the ease with which the fall of Rodgers and Klopp can be compared. Both Liverpool and Dortmund lost players fundamental to the success of their ideologies. While Rodgers lost Suarez, Sturridge, Sterling and Gerrard, Klopp had to find a way of compensating for the departures of Gotze and Lewandowski to Bayern Munich, the temporary absences of Shinji Kagawa and Nuri Sahin, and the injury problems of Ilkay Gundogan. This invites further simplistic commentary that no manager, no matter how great, could find solutions to the absences of so many excellent players. But the extent to which Klopp could not is staggering. Dortmund spent much of the first half of the season in the relegation zone, and finished the season with a win ratio of just 38.4%. There are three possible conclusions that we can draw from this. Firstly, Klopp failed as abjectly in the transfer market as the transfer committee at Liverpool that it is suggested he should replace. The veracity of this is disputed. Robert Lewandowski left for Bayern on a free transfer and Dortmund, with an infamous history of financial turmoil, could not go out and sign the superstar necessary to replace him. However, while Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang and Henrikh Mkhitaryan have become first team regulars – the former currently an integral part of Thomas Tuchel’s successful side – notable flops include Ciro Immobile and Kevin Kampl. Neither of these two players are still with the club. Yet Klopp secured the signings of Lewandowski, Kagawa and numerous significant others for a mere fraction of their current market value, and therefore Klopp has earned the opportunity to replace Liverpool’s transfer committee on merit, rather than on the basis of hysteria.

The second and third conclusions are far more perturbing for Liverpool fans. They concern Klopp’s tactical response to the departure or absence of those key players. Dortmund’s catastrophic final season under Klopp begs two possible criticisms. Firstly, if Klopp acknowledged the futility of gegenpressing after the departure of Lewandowski, Gotze et al, then the months of inept results demonstrate that Klopp could not devise an alternate approach to replicate even a modicum of the success they had previously enjoyed. A more accurate conclusion is this: gegenpressing failed.

Some of the blame for this can be apportioned to the departure of Lewandowski and Gotze, among others. But Adrian Ramos and Mkhitaryan, while not in the same elite technical bracket as Bayern’s new signings, embodied the same principles as those that they had replaced. Ramos can drop into the space in front of defenders and function as part of the build-up, while the Armenian playmaker is renowned for his work rate and technique in the same way as Gotze. Aubameyang, a lightning-quick inside forward was signed to slot seamlessly into Dortmund’s forward line, either as its centrepiece or in the space in wide positions. Klopp’s legacy did not collapse because of the departures of his key players, nor as a result of a change away from the principles that built it. Klopp’s legacy collapsed because teams realised the shortcomings of gegenpressing. As suggested earlier, Klopp believed that gegenpressing would create more chances for Dortmund than Cristiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi combined. Dortmund were coached into an understanding of how to force mistakes from opponents in possession and how to capitalise on them. Far less important was the creation of chances from open play. Without the advantage of an opposition defence transitioning into attack, and the space that would expose in the event that Dortmund regained possession, Klopp’s side quickly became predictable. They were unable to circumvent static defences. If the opposition had been drilled not to transition into attack until the seconds of intense pressure had subsided, even if Dortmund regained possession, they would not have the space they now needed to exploit that fact. Meanwhile, if the opposition offensive line dropped deeper towards the ball carrier, no matter how intensely Dortmund pressed, the opposition would always have an option available. Gegenpressing therefore ceased to be an effective mechanism of creating chances both against teams that played with limited ambition, and those that were composed enough on the ball to build moves from deep by outnumbering it.

We have discussed extensively how Liverpool stagnated in the final seventeen months of the tenure of Brendan Rodgers. His Liverpool side struggled to compensate for the loss of several players integral to their ability to exploit spaces that opponents had created for them. The players that remained were increasingly unable to create opportunities without that advantage. Rodgers then attempted to address that imbalance by pushing more players forward, placing an emphasis on possession that ensured his defence were made vulnerable by high intensity pressing.

Perhaps Liverpool fans should be less than overjoyed by the prospect of appointing a manager with a recent history of the very same.

CHELSEA: A CAMPAIGN OF COMPLACENCY AND CRISIS

Over the course of the next fortnight, stadiums across Europe will play host to the deceptively insignificant final round of qualifiers for Paris’ EURO 2016 tournament. The major surprise of the group stage – the capitulation of the Netherlands in Group A – has already been sprung. Elsewhere, the pre-qualification group favourites have performed as expected, with Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal topping their groups, while a Belgium side that consistently flatters to deceive will play Andorra and Israel in the knowledge that a solitary point will secure seats on a one-hour flight to the French capital. England have already checked in their bags and booked the No.1 Lounge at Gatwick, and face Estonia and Lithuania with license to experiment. To take stock of their success up until this point, and prepare for the tougher tests that lie in store at the showpiece.

Before the start of the 2015/16 Barclays Premier League, Jose Mourinho imagined that he would be in the same scenario come October 4th. With the exception of a second matchday trip to the Etihad Stadium, Chelsea’s autumn fixture list looked to pose few problems. Stamford Bridge would play host to Swansea, Crystal Palace, Arsenal and Southampton, while little complication would have been anticipated with away days at West Brom, a struggling Newcastle and Goodison Park, in a game that yielded six goals for the Blues in 2014/15. The Portuguese may even have contemplated the tantalising prospect of replicating that season’s unbeaten start to the campaign.

This has been definitively shattered. Chelsea fans have been forced to suffer the taunts of previously unimaginable statistics from rival fans. Eight points from eight games. In eight of their opening eleven games in all competitions, the blues have conceded at least two goals. They have conceded seventeen goals in the league; last season, people were shaking off hangovers from New Year celebrations as Chelsea conceded their fifteenth (and then sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth) goal at White Hart Lane. Prior to this season, Mourinho’s Chelsea had only lost one league match at Stamford Bridge. They have lost two of their four games in front of the Matthew Harding stand thus far. Only one player has scored more than twice; none of Willian’s four goals have come from open play.

Chelsea’s catastrophic campaign has left fans, pundits and rivals utterly perplexed by the abysmal attempt to retain the Premier League title. So where did it all go wrong?

A SEASON OF TWO HALVES

Quite a lot earlier than has been documented, actually.

Much of the narrative surrounding Chelsea’s implosion has been framed like so;

“Chelsea were CHAMPIONS last season! They won the Premier League COMFORTABLY! This isn’t the Chelsea we know!”

And so on. Except the second statement isn’t actually true. Chelsea’s blistering start to the campaign is what clings to our hippocampus. This success did not begin when Andre Schurrle applied the perfect finishing touch to a mesmeric team goal, as beautiful as it was effective. It began in June, when Jose Mourinho and the executive board met to discuss the clubs transfer dealings. Fresh in the memory was the infamous victory at Anfield that ended Liverpool’s charge to the Premier League title. Chelsea had lined up with three holding midfielders in front of what would become a back five, and won 2-0, a score that would send Jose Mourinho chest-pumping his way up the touchline, courtesy of nothing more than a slip by Steven Gerrard. Mourinho’s aim was simple: survive, then capitalise. Many perceived that this was the only possible route to success, given the imperious form of Daniel Sturridge, Raheem Sterling and Luis Suarez, but more notably as a result of Chelsea’s own creative shortcomings. With Samuel Eto’o, Fernando Torres and Demba Ba ageing, injured and painfully average, the squad desperately lacked a currently prolific goalscorer, and a deep-lying playmaker to supply them, with Frank Lampard’s influence declining with age and Chelsea’s 4-2-3-1 formation.

Both boxes were ticked with staggering success and speed. £32m brought Diego Costa, whom pundits would soon unanimously declare the perfect Premier League centre-forward, to London following a remarkable season with Atletico Madrid. The Brazilian-cum-Spaniard’s strength, power and snarling attitude combined with clinical, nerveless finishing prowess are the embodiment of Mourinho’s values. This was augmented by the surprising yet sensational signing of Cesc Fabregas from Barcelona, a player with – ostensibly – two major reasons to never sign for a Chelsea side managed by ‘The Special One’. Fabregas was trained on the wrong side of the most high profile rivalry in London by Mourinho’s antithesis, Arsene Wenger, and then bore witness to the turbulent side of his management from the comfort of an all-conquering Barcelona side. The squad overhaul extended to the recall of arguably the world’s best young goalkeeper, Thibaut Courtois, the modest acquisition of the best left back in the world of that season, Filipe Luis, and Loic Remy, a prolific goalscorer with Premier League experience to provide more than capable competition for Costa.

Arguably more important than the players signed was the manner in which their acquisitions were completed. The sales of players then-deemed surplus to requirements at the Bridge, including Romelu Lukaku and David Luiz, ensured that Chelsea ended the transfer window in an unthinkable profit. Furthermore, Costa and Fabregas put pen to paper on lengthy contracts before Chelsea played their first match of pre-season; a relatively low-key affair, with matches against the likes of Fenerbache and Werder Bremen played both in the UK and within a short haul flight to the Continent. This reflected both the need to allow key members of the squad ample time to recover from their exertions in Brazil’s World Cup, but, more importantly, the need to integrate the new signings into the squad and a designated playing style. Put succinctly, style came before substance, in matches Chelsea could win without too much of the latter.

The combined result of a string of wins in pre-season, facilitated by an incredible transfer window, was a crushing wave of morale and optimism that carried Chelsea through to New Years Day. The confidence and technical understanding pulsated through Chelsea’s opening day victory against Burnley. Chelsea conceded an early goal, but each of the three scored in instantaneous reply epitomised both the ruthless efficiency of past Mourinho sides and the new threat the Blues posed; a beautiful team goal, a smashed close-range finish from Diego Costa, and a Fabregas set piece headed home by Branislav Ivanovic. Chelsea then played with reservation in the second half, secure in the knowledge that the game was won.

Until the first of the January, this was Chelsea’s campaign in microcosm. Fabregas continued to create goals for a fully fit Costa. Eden Hazard continued to exploit space created by the former’s range of passing and the latter’s reliability in front of goal. The steadying influence of Nemanja Matic gave licence to Fabregas to both dictate matches from deep and move forward with the offensive triumvirate behind Costa. This led to four goals against Swansea, six away at Everton, three at home to Tottenham. The list could go on. The confidence bursting through the team ensured that the first XI picked itself.

Then, Harry Kane came of age.

THE SECOND HALF

The current season has seen many managers claim the scalp of one of the most successful and iconic figures in modern sporting history. And they all owe one man their gratitude.

It’s not Harry Kane

.

Mauricio Pochettino had become renowned for the work ethic he demanded of his players before his arrival at Tottenham. Sources at Southampton recall being ordered to run on hot coals, and to “work like a dog”, to challenge both their physical and mental strength. Double training sessions quickly became routine upon his arrival, twice weekly throughout pre-season, and this eventually transformed Spurs into perennial choking cockerels into renowned scorers of late goals. Allied with an acute tactical understanding, this also relegated Chelsea from an unstoppable force into a very moveable object. On 1st January 2015, no player received more instruction than Christian Eriksen. The Dane is an inconsistent genius with the ball at his feet, but Pochettino ensured he won the match without getting near the scoresheet. For the first time, not only was Cesc Fabregas identified as a defensive weak link, but a way was devised to exploit it. Fabregas’ shortcomings without the ball are well known; he is by no means the quickest central midfielder in world football, and neither does he often show much inclination to use what little he does possess to track runners. Prior to the match, this did not matter. These failings were compensated for by Matic. However Pochettino second-guessed his Chelsea counterpart, knowing that Mourinho would identify Eriksen as the main supply line to Harry Kane, and therefore correctly assumed that Mourinho would instruct Matic to attach himself to the Dane. Pochettino then instructed Eriksen to continually make movements off the ball towards the channels. This would – and did – expose the unnerving lack of pace of Chelsea’s centre halves, and also widen the space between them, creating space for Kane & company to exploit when – and whenever – they received the ball in a central position.

The resulting humiliation sparked the chain of events that now see Chelsea in their current precarious predicament. Mourinho’s response was immediate and perhaps predictable. The creative freedom afforded to Fabregas was heavily restricted. The Spaniard signed for Mourinho as a player whom Chelsea would build the attacking elements of their play around. Now he was perceived as a defensive vulnerability the whole team should compensate for. Not only did Mourinho instruct Fabregas to reduce the number of risky passes he made and maintain a constant close distance between himself and Matic, Willian and Oscar were ordered to provide greater protection to Azpilicueta and Ivanovic, in the event that the full backs were targeted by a ‘third man runner’ to expose space in front of Terry and Cahill. This had the benefit of affording Eden Hazard – identified by Andre Schurrle of late as Mourinho’s ‘special one’ – carte blanche to attack. The effect of these changes was twofold. In combination with recurring hamstring injuries suffered by Costa, Chelsea became increasingly dependent on Hazard. Thankfully for Chelsea, the mercurial Belgian delivered. It was his form in the second half of the season that virtually guaranteed a clean sweep of individual awards. The second consequence was much more intentional. After the final whistle on the first of January, Chelsea had scored forty-four goals. From this moment until securing the title at home to Crystal Palace four months later, they only managed twenty-five. Five of these came against Swansea, one of only three games in this period that Chelsea won by more than one goal. But this alarming decline in output did not worry Mourinho. Chelsea’s defence conceded just eight goals in the same period. In Mourinho’s own words in conversation with Diego Maradona, ‘I score and I win’. Then, it did not matter that the signing of Juan Cuadrado utterly failed, forcing Chelsea to start Hazard, Willian and Oscar game in, game out. It did not matter that Didier Drogba scored once in seventeen appearances in 2015, leaving Loic Remy as Costa’s only stand-in. It did not matter that Chelsea possessed no ‘pivot’ midfielder that could be brought on to change a game. One goal was all it took for Chelsea to win matches. One spectacular moment from an enfranchised Eden Hazard per ninety minutes was all it took for Chelsea to win the Premier League. A consistent team selection, subjected to consistent dogma, had yielded consistent results.

But at what price?

THE HANGOVER

We highlighted that it is often said that Chelsea breezed to the title. We can clearly see that the manner was more akin to a funeral march. Chelsea were unanimously praised in publicised season reviews for their beautiful attacking play and ability to produce results. But never did the two coincide. From January, Mourinho’s ruthless pragmatism had deprived his squad of morale, creative freedom, depth and fitness. Chelsea’s breathtaking attacking play in the opening half the season had afforded Mourinho the privileged position of managing a team where the first eleven picked itself. Meanwhile, the remainder of Chelsea’s squad players either stagnated or agitated for a move away from Stamford Bridge. This meant that, after humiliation against Spurs, Mourinho had to – or believed it necessary to – orchestrate a complete change in playing style, using the same fourteen players that put Chelsea in its current position. The result would be plummeting morale in the squad. The chosen few would exhaust themselves in pursuit of the Premier League title, forgetting what it was like to enjoy playing football and scoring goals for their own sake, while isolation beckoned for the rest. John Terry went on to lift the Premier League trophy, so it must be argued that Mourinho’s changes were successful. But to say that Chelsea coasted to the title, winning it in comfort, is a complete falsehood.

PRE-PRE-SEASON

With the Premier League (and Capital One Cup) secured, the club’s focus began to shift towards pre-season. It should have been clear that pre-season should have been targeted at rediscovering the optimism and flair that had been lost over the course of a functional spring. Chelsea’s fixtures should have afforded the key players in the squad the opportunity to recover from their gruelling campaign, with sufficient days and short flights between matches, and rediscover the sensation of scoring goals and playing without fear, through playing mediocre opposition. Central to this would have been re-establishing Cesc Fabregas’ pivotal role in the teams identity. Chelsea’s playing style had transformed from one built around the strengths of Fabregas’ game into something that compensated for his weaknesses. This had to be reversed; Fabregas’ decisive creative contribution was the sole reason Chelsea had a foothold to cling to in spring. Removing the pressure from, and therefore granting greater freedom to, Chelsea’s key players would also require a transfer window akin to the previous summer; with squad depth of genuine first-team quality signed quickly, in order to allow effective integration into the squad and playing style prior to the competitiveness of the Premier League.

Chelsea never failed to miss an opportunity. The first major mistake was to schedule a post-season tour/victory parade/marketing event of two fixtures played in Australia and Thailand. Despite being omnipresent and recovering from injury respectively, Eden Hazard and Diego Costa, along with the majority of the first team squad, were commercially obligated to be involved in both matches. Jose Mourinho was obligated to rationalise the fixtures as a ‘good way to celebrate’ away from the ‘pressures and tensions of the Premier League’. With a squad comprised of exhausted key players that wanted to celebrate with their families, squad players that felt that they had played no part in Chelsea’s success, and reserve players that wanted no part in Chelsea’s future, it was no surprise that the victory parade produced two stale 1-0 victories.

DID SOMEONE SAY 2014?

After landing at London Heathrow in early June, the squad were finally allowed to break up for their well earned and belated holidays. However, it appears that the rest of Chelsea Football Club did too. It was not until one month later that Chelsea made their first signing of the transfer window. Radamel Falcao scored just four goals in twenty-eight matches while on loan from Monaco at Manchester United. The Colombian centre-forward arrived with the odds resolutely stacked against him, having experienced the excruciating physical pain of rupturing a cruciate ligament, the consequent psychological pain of missing a South American World Cup at the peak of his career, and a significant effect on his match fitness. Falcao was then expected to replicate his world-class pedigree in a team that changed formation and personnel game in, game out, as Louis van Gaal struggled to understand how his philosophy would manifest itself at United. Furthermore, Falcao’s lack of English language and uncertainty over the length of his stay in England meant that Falcao would never settle at United. Jose Mourinho’s “close” relationship with Jorge Mendes ensured that Falcao would get another chance in the Premier League, at a heavily discounted price to Chelsea. Chelsea’s reaction to the signing was mixed; between those that expected Falcao to set Old Trafford alight, and those that understood that the Colombian could only improve at Chelsea. He would not be signed as Chelsea’s first choice striker, his understanding of England and its football was strengthened, and the Chelsea dressing room was dominated by South Americans, Spanish speakers and former team-mates. Yet Falcao’s arrival made no difference to Chelsea’s starting XI, and by the same date the previous summer, Chelsea had already signed Costa and Fabregas. The contrast could not have been starker.

Chelsea’s next move was to replace Arsenal-bound club icon Petr Cech. The previous summer, Chelsea had signed a former Arsenal hero. Chelsea reciprocated. The transfer was received with empathy by both the club’s fans and owner. Over the past eleven years and countless trophies, Cech had earned the right to leave Chelsea and remain in London for the sake of his family, in pursuit of more game time that had been denied by the return of Thibaut Courtois. But the fans pessimism was shared by Mourinho. Both understood that no matter who was signed, Chelsea would be worse off for the deal. Mourinho refused to give the deal his blessing. But it happened anyway. Chelsea promptly signed Asmir Begovic for £8m from Stoke as an able deputy to Courtois. Privately, the first undercurrent of hostility between Mourinho and his executive was stirred. John Stones was then targeted, with a £20m bid flatly rejected by Everton. At this stage the incredibly promising one-time Barnsley centre-back was thought of as a long-term successor to John Terry, maybe one day as captain. For the time being, he would serve as competition. This was not to remain the case.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLACENT CHAMPIONS CUP

Having exhausted the first team squad on a post-season tour, and then failing to improve it in the transfer market, Chelsea embarked on a pre-season tour that ticked every conceivable wrong box. Chelsea would fly to the United States to participate in the International Challenge Cup, consisting of three matches – against New York Red Bulls, Barcelona and Paris Saint-Germain – in as many states over the course of just six days. Chelsea lost the opening match against the Red Bulls 4-2. Mourinho’s post match press conference, intended as a statement of defiance, only served to highlight the enormous oversights that would explain the botched preparation for the start of the new season:

“I am the manager of the best team of England, we have top players, there are no fragilities. We have done 11 sessions in six days. We trust these players. We play this team 10 times, we win nine – but the second half was a disaster. If we had won 10-0 that wouldn’t have been any good. We needed a test and we received one.”

The first conclusion we can draw from this statement is that Mourinho had been lulled in to a false sense of security. Some may call this semantics, but the claim that there were ‘no fragilities’ in his squad showed that the manager thought he had found a defensive solution for his team’s problems in the final third. Chelsea’s resolute stumble to the Premier League title had fostered a complacency about a diminishing offensive output. It did not matter that a forward line that at any given point contained Fabregas, Oscar, Hazard, Remy and Diego Costa only scored twice against a mediocre side playing their academy players. Chelsea would have scored enough goals to win the game, had it not been for a second half which saw academy products given run-outs. The ‘I score and I win’ doctrine would have been executed. No value was attributed to the confidence gained by scoring a hatful of goals. Mourinho overlooked the long-term benefits of rediscovering a clear identity when moving the ball forward. Much more important was a test for his trusted players. A test they were not prepared for as a result of ignorance or of the impact of such a concentrated period of training on an already exhausted squad, and the absence of new first-team quality signings. Following these points, it is clear that prior to crossing the Atlantic, Mourinho thought his team would be in a position to overcome the challenges faced by their pre-season opponents, and that doing so would be the best possible preparation for the upcoming campaign.

Two incorrect assumptions. Based upon a complacency that had no reason to have develop. Two 2-2 draws against second-string Barcelona and Paris Saint-Germain, combined with a home defeat in the ‘Cuadrado’ friendly against Fiorentina should have proved that Chelsea did not have the style to bring home the substance Mourinho craved, and worsened the lactic acid building up in the legs of the first team squad.

COMMUNITY? SHIELD?

Chelsea’s last action of a rotten pre-season was to contest the Community Shield against Arsenal. A fixture that Chelsea were able to participate in because they had won the league. A fact that was relished by Mourinho, and paraded in front of Arsenal’s ‘specialist in failure’, Arsene Wenger. Their personal rivalry pressured Mourinho in to making yet another sacrifice in the name of substance over style. Chelsea’s team sheet read as follows;

Courtois; Ivanovic, Cahill, Terry, Azpilicueta; Fabregas, Matic; Willian, Hazard, Ramires; Remy.

The only two changes Mourinho made to his title-winning, exhausted side were enforced. One by Diego Costa’s continued absence through injury. Falcao was signed as a third-choice striker, it seemed. One was forced by Mourinho’s reluctance to risk losing to Wenger. Ramires was awkwardly placed on the right hand side of midfield, in order to attempt to shackle Arsenal’s threat from wide on the left – the normal starting berth of Alexis Sanchez, sensibly rested by Wenger after his heroics at the Copa America with Chile. Once more, Oscar, and with him Chelsea’s creative freedom, was consigned to the bench, marginalised in the pursuit of victory. The final score was 1-0 to Arsenal. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain scored the winner early in the first half. Cesc Fabregas lost the ball upfield and did not track Theo Walcott, who found himself isolating Matic and Chelsea’s centre halves. John Terry, apprehensive of Walcott’s pace and wanting to support Matic, charged towards the ball. Walcott simply spread the ball to Oxlade-Chamberlain, who cut inside Azpilicueta into vacant space to rifle home. Chelsea did not force a save from Cech until a stinging free-kick from Oscar, late in the second half.

A North London side perfectly exploited a lack of defensive diligence from Fabregas, and a lack of pace in Chelsea’s defence. A familiar narrative.

Losing to Arsene Wenger for the first time in fourteen attempts seemed to trigger an epiphany in Jose Mourinho. The tension between the Portuguese and the club’s executives began to simmer. In a thinly veiled swipe at Chelsea’s lack of transfer activity – initiated by his own complacency – Mourinho claimed that Max Gradel, Georginio Wijnaldum and Yohan Cabaye, new signings for Bournemouth, Newcastle and Crystal Palace respectively, could all play for Chelsea. The club’s pursuit of Stones intensified into aggression and hostility between Mourinho and Roberto Martinez and a series of escalating bids, into astronomical sums that made it clear that Stones was more of a short-term necessity than had been previously thought. The bids publicly undermined the defence that had won Chelsea the league title, a sense exacerbated by Mourinho’s decision to substitute his captain for Kurt Zouma in the second half. It also made it fundamentally clear, for the umpteenth time, where Mourinho’s priorities lay.

I score and I win.

Therefore, prior to the opening match of the season against Swansea, the situation is as follows.

a) The first team, shallow as a result of last season’s lack of rotation and this summer’s lack of transfer activity, is exhausted from a challenging pre-season played across the globe.

b) The first team has not been in a physical condition to win its difficult matches, but this has been the focus anyway.

c) Chelsea do not have the confidence to play the expansive football, built around Fabregas, that gave its defence the foothold to cling to from January onwards.

d) The defence has been publicly undermined by Mourinho’s complacent, mistaken and retracted belief in its security.

e) Mourinho’s oversights in the transfer market have developed into a major source of contention between himself and the club.

KICK OFF

In this context – and with the ever-helpful benefit of hindsight – the events of Chelsea’s opening game of the season play out as little surprise. Chelsea take an early lead from an Oscar free-kick. From a position wide on the left, he swings the ball perfectly into an area of on-rushing players that paralyses Fabianski. He cannot stand still, in case someone beats him to it and heads in to an unguarded net. He cannot come for the ball, in case no one touches it. The ball nestles in the bottom corner for Chelsea’s first goal of the season. A goal of exquisite technical ability from Chelsea’s number 8. Instead of wildly celebrating, he just stands unmoved, then turns to glare at the bench. If eyes could speak a thousand words, they would only need two sentences here. ‘This is what I can do. Let me off the leash.‘ Mourinho returns the icy stare.

Swansea equalize swiftly. Jefferson Montero, a bundle of pace and trickery, with Matic in close attention dribbles comfortably past Ivanovic, who allows him to cross for Bafetimbi Gomis, who then forces an unbelievable save from Thibaut Courtois. Despite the close attentions of Terry and Cahill, the rebound falls to Andre Ayew, who fires a first-time rebound straight at the former. The Ghanian has time to simultaneously pick himself up and drag the ball away from the despairing defenders, a quite brilliant piece of skill, before lashing home into the bottom corner. Three shots on goal, in total.

In the background, you can see Cesc Fabregas, no more than ten feet behind Ayew. Walking.

Chelsea then restore their lead, courtesy of a Willian cross that takes a freak deflection off Federico Fernandez and, seemingly impossibly, loops over Fabianksi through a narrow trajectory. Chelsea lead at half time, through a set piece and an enormous amount of luck. Chelsea’s lead does not last. A simple ball over John Terry makes the captain look sluggish as Gomis bears down on goal. Courtois reacts late, clatters the advancing Frenchman, concedes a penalty, and is sent off. Gomis converts past the deputising Begovic – who replaces Oscar – to equalise once more.

A South Wales side perfectly exploit a lack of defensive diligence from Fabregas and a lack of pace of Chelsea’s defence. A familiar narrative.

Predictably, Eden Hazard, the depleted team’s sole creative outlet, creates a host of chances that Chelsea fail to convert. He is then involved in a nasty challenge, and writhes in apparent agony on the pitch.

No one could have expected what happens next.

CARNAGE OF EVA CARNEIRO

Eva Carneiro and Jon Fearn run on to the pitch, performing their duty as doctors to attempt to treat someone they reasonably believe to be injured. Jose Mourinho promptly begins to scream at his medics, realising that as they have entered the field of play, Eden Hazard will have to leave the pitch, leaving Chelsea down to nine men and increasing the risk of conceding a third, and possibly winning, goal. Fortunately, from a Chelsea perspective, Mourinho’s fears are not realised, and his team survive scare-free until Hazard resumes play. This does not stop a heated exchange in Portuguese between manager and medic as Carneiro returns to the bench. This should have been the end of the matter.

Instead, Jose Mourinho, anxious to talk about something over than a calamitous defensive performance that saw his team twice forfeit a lead and concede the most amount of shots on goal from an away team at Stamford Bridge in its history, vented about the ‘naivety and impulsiveness’ of his club doctors making sure his star player was unhurt and able to carry on unlocking the Swansea defence. Carneiro would never work for Chelsea again, instigating a number of investigations against her former boss – with allegations of unfair dismissal and sexism – on her way to the back door exit.

The media frenzy surrounding the scandal was arguably the fiercest Mourinho has ever encountered. But this was not the significant aspect of the crisis; Mourinho could channel the media attention to create a siege mentality, if his players bought into it.

If.

For the Eva Carneiro scandal has quickly turned an already tense relationship with his exhausted, marginalised and undermined players into a toxic one. This extends beyond the fact that Carneiro had been with Chelsea for six years, and was an immensely popular figure amongst players. Chelsea were able to win the Premier League in 2014/2015 with such a depleted squad for two fundamental reasons; firstly, because the work of the medical staff was fundamental in maintaining player fitness below breaking point; and secondly, because Eden Hazard would take risks. As discussed, post-January the team structure was conducted so as to allow Hazard to operate without defensive responsibility and with the licence to take on – and always beat – defenders. Whenever pressed on the subject in interviews, Hazard informs us that he rates his performance in terms of the number of times he is fouled. The more times he is fouled, the more the opposition team have found themselves unable to cope with him. Now put yourself in Hazard’s shoes. A popular figure in your team, and arguably the reason you achieved the biggest success of your career, is sacked because you stay down after a tackle. After taking a risk. How do you respond?

You feel guilty. You take less risks.

It is no coincidence that Chelsea’s alarming increase in goals conceded has coincided with Hazard’s crisis of confidence. Chelsea’s wingers, creative midfielders, full-backs and strikers are all under strict instruction to protect the soft underbelly of central defence. They are exhausted and low on confidence, and cannot hope to fill the void left by Hazard’s slump. But that means that they have no choice but to try. To do so means abdicating some of their defensive responsibilities. Creativity cannot hope to succeed in the vices of a crisis of confidence. Failure here means being rendered vulnerable to the counter-attack. And pace is not something Chelsea’s defence is capable of responding to.

YOU TAKE THE BLUE PILL, YOU SEE HOW DEEP THE RABBIT HOLE GOES

The last match that Jose Mourinho would have wanted in this situation was Manchester City away. Yet exactly this lay in store. And the same themes inherent in Chelsea’s attitude to pre-season and the defensive frailties exposed by Swansea reared their ugly head, in very predictable fashion. David Silva found pockets of space behind Matic and in front of Terry and Cahill, who then could not handle the pace and sublime finishing of Sergio Aguero. Once more, the defence was publicly undermined as Terry was hauled off at half time, replaced by Kurt Zouma, as Mourinho claimed Chelsea needed a faster centre half to cope with Aguero. This revealed both an inexplicable oversight from Mourinho, in that Zouma should have started the game if this was the case, and his negative ideology. Chelsea were trailing by a single goal at the Etihad. While they had created few chances, they were still very much in the game.

Mourinho’s first thought? Damage limitation. For all of Mourinho’s claims to the contrary, this was not an effective policy. Chelsea were perhaps unlucky to see a legitimate Ramires goal chalked off for offside, and Eden Hazard forced a brilliant save from Joe Hart. But to say that Chelsea had ‘no problem’ in the second half, despite conceding a further two goals to add to Aguero’s opener, and that the result was ‘fake’ as a consequence was a blatant lie. Only a catalogue of fine saves from Asmir Begovic, luck, and inept City finishing denied City a cricket score. Ivanovic was comfortably beaten in the air by Kompany for the second goal, and then – between himself and Fabregas – contrived to present the ball to David Silva on the edge of his own penalty area, with his colleagues in disarray as they began to mount a counter-attack. One pass to Fernandinho later, and it was three. Mourinho’s post match comments once more underlined his view that only the result of a match could possibly be conceived as significant. Chelsea’s shaky defence disagreed. Some cause for optimism was found post-match, with the signing of Baba Rahman, the young left back from Augsburg, confirmed for a fee of around £17m in the immediate aftermath of the game. The Ghanaian may not have brought the pedigree of Felipe Luis to the Chelsea bench, but he did bring pace and potential, and competition for Branislav Ivanovic. Or so it was thought. Rahman has played just one match for Chelsea thus far – a routine win over Maccabi Tel Aviv, in order to rest Ivanovic for his duel with Alexis Sanchez the following weekend.

Jose Mourinho’s failed campaign to achieve substance over style could not have been more perfectly illustrated by matchday three: an away trip to West Brom. Their last visit came in the form of a 3-0 defeat the game after Chelsea secured the Premier League title. The fixture was meaningless for both sides, and therefore there was no pressure on Chelsea to perform. There was now. The squad had received an enormous lift with the signing of Pedro from Barcelona, under the noses of Manchester United. Pedro had amassed a quite enormous collection of trophies over the course of a career at the Nou Camp. A serial winner that would take no time at all to settle in to a problem position for Chelsea, who decided to join Chelsea after a number of calls from Mourinho stressing his importance in his plans. The deal ticked all the boxes for an exciting marquee signing. Pedro made the debut to match his billing, with a sparkling first half yielding a goal after excellent link-up play with Hazard, and an assist for Diego Costa. But since that match – and because of what happened during it – things have proved to be too good to be true. Pedro made his debut at the Hawthorns just three days after signing for Chelsea, and took up position on the right side of a 4-2-3-1, in front of Ivanovic. For the entirety of Barcelona’s golden years, he had operated in a 4-3-3 formation, with the rapid Dani Alves behind him. The extra man in midfield and the independence of Alves ensured that Pedro was rarely asked to track back. Plus, against most teams during Pedro’s time at Barcelona, they could always score more goals. Pedro did not understand how to effectively support Ivanovic, and as a result, the Serbian was torn to shreds by Callum McManaman and James Morrison. Average wingers, at best, but enough to give Ivanovic a torrid afternoon. Combine that with Cesc Fabregas switching off defensively, and you get… a familiar narrative. Pedro has looked a shadow of the player since, with a fraction of the freedom. Chelsea won, by the skin of their teeth. 3-2, with West Brom missing an early penalty, and had John Terry sent off for a last-man tug on Solomon Rondon. The sending off of Terry meant that after the end of the home defeat to Crystal Palace, Chelsea had gone the first four games without naming the same back five in consecutive matches, or ending a single game with the same back five that started it.

Therefore, up until this point, Jose Mourinho had been putting out an exhausted first team squad that he was complacent enough to believe didn’t need strengthening until it was too late. With the creativity and freedom coached out of it, even that of the player that the change was designed to benefit. Which had been compensated for by a stable and holistic approach to defending, that has now evaporated as a result of injury, suspension, age, public humiliation and a lack of protection. Links between manager and squad have been shattered by restriction of freedom, overworking, and sacking of popular figures responsible for Chelsea’s title victory. In this context, it is not difficult to understand further defeats at home to Crystal Palace and Southampton, a 3-1 defeat at Goodison Park, capitulation against Porto in the Champions League, and a pitiful draw against Newcastle.

To describe the situation as a catastrophe does not do it justice.

SO WHAT CAN CHELSEA DO?

Roman Ambramovich and numerous members of the first team squad have come out in public to support Jose Mourinho. Those that have not, including Oscar and Eden Hazard, tell us far more about the reality of life at Chelsea than Jose’s devotees. I find it unthinkable to be saying this, but the situation is such that the best option for all parties would be for Chelsea and Jose Mourinho to part ways, amicably or otherwise. But that is simply not going to happen, especially with a rumoured £30m worth of compensation payable if it did. So we must now place ourselves into Jose’s shoes. Branislav Ivanovic has been a constant source of concern, against both quick and painfully average opposition. The right hand side of Chelsea is persistently targeted, and this is because Ivanovic, in such terrible form in the midst of uncertainty surrounding his future, is being isolated by the defensive shortcomings of an immobile Fabregas and an unaccustomed Pedro. Yet Mourinho has recently made it absolutely clear that he cannot drop Ivanovic, as Chelsea would become impotent at both defending and attacking set pieces, should he be replaced by the more slightly-built Rahman. This argument is fundamentally flawed, because Ivanovic has not offered a threat at offensive set pieces, and has been at fault for the few goals Chelsea have conceded from them. But there is a way to circumvent Mourinho’s reluctance to drop Ivanovic, with a number of additional bonuses.

The answer is to be found in the 4-3-3 formation.

As we have discussed, the vast majority of goals conceded by Chelsea have come about through insufficient protection for Chelsea’s full backs, widening the space between centre-backs in the process. Pedro could be removed from the spotlight and afforded the opportunity to meaningfully integrate into Chelsea’s squad, and replaced with a defensive midfielder. With Matic and Fabregas in the pivot, Matic is often isolated by Fabregas’ lack of positional discipline. With another defensively minded midfielder incorporated into Chelsea’s side, more freedom could be afforded to Fabregas, as Chelsea would always have a double-block on supply lines into dangerous positions, and the ability to cover a wider space. This could perhaps be seen as a more attacking variation of Mourinho’s infamous ‘trivote’ of Lassana Diarra, Sami Khedira and Xabi Alonso. But it would enable Fabregas to see more of the ball and have more options around him when he receives it, rebuilding both his role in the team and his confidence.

With Ivanovic’s attacking output faltering as quickly as his defensive contribution, Baba Rahman would naturally come in to the first team, with his occasionally ‘rash’ positioning compensated for by the third man in midfield. The Ghanaian showed enormously encouraging signs of an understanding with Eden Hazard against Maccabi Tel Aviv. As Rahman grew into the game, so did Hazard, who benefited from Rahman’s overlapping runs. Yet to drop Ivanovic would leave Mourinho one tall player short on set pieces. It is a happy coincidence, therefore, that Chelsea happen to possess a physically imposing defensive midfielder, comfortable enough in possession to demand the ball from established first team players, expanding the depth of Mourinho’s squad in the process – by allowing a potential bench of Begovic, Ivanovic, Ramires, Willian, Oscar, Remy, Falcao.

His name is Ruben Loftus-Cheek.